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Abstract—Adversarial evasion attacks have been very success-
ful in causing poor performance in a wide variety of machine
learning applications. One such application is radio frequency
spectrum sensing. While evasion attacks have proven particularly
successful in this area, they have done so at the detriment of
the signal’s intended purpose. More specifically, for real-world
applications of interest, the resulting perturbed signal that is
transmitted to evade an eavesdropper must not deviate far from
the original signal, less the intended information is destroyed.
Recent work by the authors and others has demonstrated an
attack framework that allows for intelligent balancing between
these conflicting goals of evasion and communication. However,
while these methodologies consider creating adversarial signals
that minimize communications degradation, they have been
shown to do so at the expense of the spectral shape of the
signal. This opens the adversarial signal up to defenses at the
eavesdropper such as filtering, which could render the attack
ineffective. To remedy this, this work introduces a new spectral
deception loss metric that can be implemented during the training
process to force the spectral shape to be more in-line with the
original signal. As an initial proof of concept, a variety of methods
are presented that provide a starting point for this proposed loss.
Through performance analysis, it is shown that these techniques
are effective in controlling the shape of the adversarial signal.
Index Terms—adversarial machine learning, cognitive radio
security, radio frequency machine learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Boosted by continued improvements in areas such as pro-
cessing power, storage capacity, and architectural improve-
ments, machine learning algorithms have seen increased usage
in recent years and have shown great potential benefit in a
wide variety of research fields. One such emerging research
field is signal processing, where research has focused on
utilizing recent advancements in machine learning to improve
on traditional digital signal processing techniques through
increased performance and/or a reduced need for a priori
knowledge. Example signal processing applications showing
promise in their utilization of machine learning include spec-
trum signal detection, synthetic modulation schemes, direc-
tion of arrival calculation, jamming detection [1], [2], and
automatic modulation classifiers (AMC) [3]–[6], among many
others. AMC research in particular has shown significant
promise in utilizing machine learning to reduce requirements
on pre-defined expert features by utilizing state-of-the-art
convolutional neural networks for performing both feature
extraction and classification tasks [7], [8].
Fig. 1: A wireless communications scenario in which an
intended communications link is being eavesdropped by a
machine learning based spectrum sensor. The transmitter uti-
lizes an adversarial evasion attack to intelligently ”perturb” its
signal to evade the eavesdropper [9].
Given the improvements that machine learning can offer,
and thus the adoption of such methods in real world ap-
plications, the security of these networks must be further
considered. Recent research has shown that adversarial attacks
can harm the performance of machine learning networks by
forcing misclassifications or otherwise causing the network to
operate in ways orthogonal to its intended use or desired appli-
cation [10]–[12]. Various adversarial techniques can be used
to attack a machine learning network, such as poisoning [13],
Trojan [14], and evasion attacks. In the context of attacking
AMC networks, the focus of this work, evasion attacks have
been used to make slight intelligent changes to signals so that
a trained AMC machine learning algorithm misclassifies the
signal [15]–[18]. Therefore, these adversarial techniques can
be used as a mitigation approach against eavesdroppers and
other malicious actors.
When developing these attacks, there is a natural tradeoff
that arises between security and the intended application.
For example, while the goal of an evasion attack against
an AMC machine learning algorithm is to cause a misclas-
sification and/or reduce user confidence, it is important that
the perturbed signal still accomplish its intended use of still
being successfully received by its intended target. In the
field of image recognition, this manifests in the idea that
an image perturbed by an adversarial attack should still be
easily discernible, and even viewed as untouched, by a human
observing the image [11].
The adversarial scenario considered in this work is illus-
trated by Figure 1. As previously mentioned, balancing the two
conflicting goals of evasion of an eavesdropper and successful
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communication by an intended receiver is difficult and has
been examined in previous work [9], [19]–[21]. In this work,
the idea of successful perception of the signal at the receiver
is driven using metrics such as bit error rate (BER) that
indicate the success of the communication. In addition, this
work presents a novel form of perception to be considered
alongside BER, that of spectral integrity. The previous works
in this area have shown that adversarial perturbations naturally
tend to manifest out of the main lobe of the signal and lead
to adversarial signals that do not hold well the same spectral
shape as the original signal [20]. This change in the spectral
shape of the signal poses a problem to the success of the
attack as the eavesdropper could leverage preprocessing stages
to reduce the impact of the perturbation, such as with a filter,
and potentially can lead to increased likelihood of detection
that an attack is taking place since the spectral shape does not
appear benign.
This work introduces a new loss metric for training machine
learning based adversarial evasion attacks that helps maintain
spectral integrity of the adversarially perturbed signal while
still successfully achieving evasion and solid communication.
Section II of this paper first provides a background on previous
work done in this field and the particular evasion attack method
used in this work. Section III introduces candidate spectral
integrity loss metrics and provides relevant performance anal-
ysis. Finally, Section IV concludes this work and discusses
future work based on these findings.
II. BACKGROUND
Without proper care, evasion attacks used to fool an AMC
machine learning algorithm generally have a drastic negative
impact on the communication link between the transmitter and
intended receiver. Recently, work by the authors and others
have examined how these attacks can be improved in order to
provide a better balance between these two conflicting goals.
Hameed et. al. [19] accomplished this by introducing a gradi-
ent descent training method to craft signal perturbations that
utilize a combined target function that considers both evasion
performance and BER. While BER is non-differentiable, and
thus not suited to gradient based learning approaches, a gra-
dient is estimated using simultaneous perturbation stochastic
approximation (SPSA). This approaches offers improvement
over previous methods where the perturbation was simply
power limited in the hope that this would lead to decreased
BER. Flowers et al. improved upon these prior works through
the development of a so-called ”communications-aware” attack
[20].
For the communications-aware attack, an Adversarial Resid-
ual Network (ARN) is leveraged in order to learn to make
intelligent signal perturbations that balance the two opposing
goals of evasion and communication. This approach utilizes
three separate loss functions to accomplish this: adversarial
loss, communication loss, and power loss. These three losses
are each weighted and summed together to guide the ARNs
learning process. The work of [9] expanded on the commu-
nications aware architecture first introduced in [20] in order
to better utilize forward error correction (FEC), but it was
found that the changes to the loss functions and transmitter
architecture provided improvements beyond just utilizing FEC.
The training framework presented in [9], and illustrated in
Figure 2, serves as the foundation for the work presented in
this paper.
As shown in Figure 2, the considered approach utilizes an
Adversarial Mutation network (AMN) that is trained to create
an intelligently perturbed signal given the original signal as
input. This adversarial signal is what is transmitted to the
intended receiver and intercepted by the eavesdropper. The
AMN consists of a convolutional neural network (CNN). It is
assumed here that the eavesdropper utilizes an AMC network
with the architecture described in [3] trained for BPSK, QPSK,
8PSK, 16QAM, and 64QAM. Each AMN is trained to create
adversarial signals for just one modulation scheme at at a time.
As previously mentioned, the AMN developed in [9] utilizes
three loss functions to train the AMN network, namely:
• Adversarial Loss: prioritizes the AMN’s ability to suc-
cessfully learn to avoid classification by the eavesdropper.
It is calculated using the confidence of the eavesdropper
in the true source modulation, ps, determined using the
output of the final softmax layer in the eavesdropper’s
AMC.
• Communication Loss: prioritizes the AMN’s ability to
successfully learn to maintain the communication link
between the transmitter and friendly receiver. It does this
by using the calculated BER, br, as well as the error
vector magnitude (EVM) between the clean symbols and
the perturbed symbols, defined as |Stx − Stx+p|. BER is
calculated using the original bits at the transmitter and the
final bits decoded at the receiver after undergoing AWGN
channel effects. The AWGN channel adds random noise
between 0-20 dB. In this work it is assumed that the
transmitter has access to the receiver in order to know
the bits received. The BER is the true metric that the
network wants to minimize, but is non-differentiable, so
the EVM, which is differentiable, acts as a proxy for
the BER and provides a gradient indicating the direction
the weights should update. The BER then provides the
magnitude of the update along this gradient.
• Power Loss: prioritizes the AMN’s ability to learn to min-
imize the power of the perturbation so that the adversarial
signal is close to the original signal. It does this by using
the inverse of the signal-to-perturbation ratio (SPR).
During the AMN’s training process, these three losses are
each scaled and then summed together to create the total loss.
These scaling factors allow for finer balancing between the
communication and evasion goals. The scaling factors are α
for adversarial loss, β for communications loss, and γ for
power loss. More specifically, increasing a scaling factor rel-
ative to the others during training results in the corresponding
loss being more highly prioritized. These loss constants are
restricted such that they must sum to 1. Finally, the three
loss functions are designed such that they all converge to
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Fig. 2: The training process that this work builds off of. It utilizes three losses, evasion loss, communication loss, and power
loss each calculated at the eavesdropper, receiver, and transmitter respectively [9]. This work will replace the power loss
calculated in the transmitter, leaving the others untouched.
zero. Therefore the network learns to minimize the loss values
during training. Currently, these loss constants are estimated
during training based on the rough needs of the system,
such as whether evasion, communication, or power should be
more important. A more exhaustive look into the best way to
determine the values of the constants is left to future work.
During the training process, the total loss is back-propagated
through the CNN of the AMN to update the weights in order to
create the most effective adversarial signal. The optimization
technique used is Adam. To summarize, the loss functions are
defined below:
Ltotal = αLadv + βLcomm + γLpwr (1)
Ladv = −log(1− ps) (2)
Lcomm = br × EVM(Stx, Stx+p) (3)
Lpwr =
1
Es/Ep
=
Ep
Es
(4)
The architecture changes specified in [9], originally de-
signed for use of forward error correction coding on the
signal, allowed for improved spectral shape over the results
seen in [20]. This improvement was predominantly due to
improvements in the power loss metric and the usage of AMN
as opposed to an ARN.
In this work, the same framework described above is used.
However, here the power loss is replaced with a novel loss
metric termed spectral deception loss. The goal of this loss will
be to more explicitly train the network to create adversarial
signals that follow the same spectral shape as the original
signal, while still balancing between the conflicting goals
of evasion and intended communications. The rest of the
architecture, including the adversarial and communication loss,
remains unchanged.
III. SPECTRAL DECEPTION LOSS
In this section, a variety of candidate spectrum deception
loss metrics are presented, and their different impacts on the
adversarial signal’s spectral content are analyzed, along with
its performance on eavesdropper evasion and intended commu-
nication capabilities. As previously discussed, it is desirable
for the adversarial signal to have a similar spectral shape as
the original signal so that it avoids detection and defensive
capabilities. In this work, we determine this similarity through
the power spectral density (PSD) and associated phase plot
of the original signal, perturbation, and combined adversarial
signal. Due to space considerations, only the PSD and not
the phase plots are shown as the PSD provides a much better
indication of success.
A. Examining the Necessity of Deception Loss
In the previous work, there was uncertainty over whether
the power loss metric was sufficiently useful at providing
the desired intent of maintaining the original shape of the
signal. This was due partially to the fact that the two main
performance metrics, BER and evasion classification success,
were driven directly by the communication and adversarial
loss, respectively, and not by the power loss. Additionally, the
power loss and communication loss were shown to push the
Accepted at WiseML 2020
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Fig. 3: The BER and eavesdropper classification accuracy
for QPSK adversarial signals when trained with either only
communications loss or only power loss. The values are
plotted over a range of 0-20 dB SNR. The theoretical values
for the BER and classification accuracy of QPSK are shown.
network to converge in the exact same way for these metrics,
as is shown in Figure 3, leading to unnecessary redundancy
among these two losses.
It makes sense that these two losses would provide similar
results for the chosen performance metrics. However, obser-
vation of the PSD of the resulting adversarial signal when
prioritizing each loss highlights the true differences between
them. An example of this difference is shown in Figure 4.
Prioritizing the power loss results in a PSD shape for the
perturbation that is similar to the original signal, only less
powerful. On the other hand, prioritizing the communication
loss results in a PSD that is more jagged in the center lobe and
has significant side lobe content. From this result, it can be
observed that the power loss metric steers the training of the
AMN to keep the spectral shape of the original signal while
the communication loss metric disregards the original signal
shape as long as the intended receiver is minimally impacted.
While the power loss appears to provide the exact behavior
desired to maintain spectral integrity, this is only true under
an ideal scenario. In the power loss result shown in Figure
4, the power loss is the only loss prioritized. However, when
being balanced with the communication and evasion losses,
the shape, while still an improvement on previous work, no
longer resembles a clean signal and has some side lobe content
[9]. Spectral deception loss is introduced as a solution to this
problem so that the spectral integrity can be preserved even
when successfully evading and communicating. The deception
loss will operate in the frequency domain and thus allows for
the AMN to better control the frequency content of the signal
as opposed to the prior power loss metric that controls the time
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Fig. 4: The PSD for both a perturbation created using only
communication loss and one created using only power loss
compared to the PSD of the original signal.
content of the signal. This should allow for better success in
shaping the signal. As mentioned previously, this control over
the spectral shape is desirable so that the attack can better
avoid defenses such as filtering in the preprocessing stage of
the eavesdropper. Previous work resulted in perturbations that
had significant content in the side lobe. Such a perturbation
could be weakened by a low pass filter that would remove this
side lobe content and potentially render the attack ineffective.
By forcing the perturbation to be more in lobe, the deception
loss should help the attack remain robust to these forms of
filtering and defense.
B. Deception Loss
The deception loss method to be discussed within this work
is based upon the frequency domain characteristics of the
signal. More specifically, the proposed deception loss function
operates on the Fast-Fourier Transform (FFT) of both the
perturbation and original signal. This is done so that the
perturbation lies more in-band and thus the adversarial signal
will exhibit less side-lobe content and appear more benign.
A function must be used in order to quantify the difference
between the two FFTs. Two functions, Mean Squared Error
(MSE) and Huber, are examined in this paper for their poten-
tial use in the deception loss.
1) MSE FFT Loss: MSE is a regression loss function that
determines the difference between expected and actual values.
In this paper, MSE is used as the average squared difference
between the FFTs of the original signal and the perturbation.
MSE is defined as:
1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − yˆi)
2 (5)
where y is the value of the original signal and yˆ is the value
of the perturbation. After calculation, the loss was normalized
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Fig. 5: The PSD for the perturbations created by the original
power loss and both the MSE and Huber loss methods for the
FFT-based approach on BPSK signals.
such that 0 ≤MSE ≤ 1 to better align with the communication
and adversarial loss values.
2) Huber FFT Loss: Although MSE is a good comparison
metric for two functions, it is often heavily influenced by
outliers. Huber loss mitigates the affect of outliers through an
adjustable delta value, δ. If the absolute difference between
the expected and actual value is less than δ, then Huber loss
calculates their difference using an equation similar to MSE.
Otherwise, the affect of the outlier is adjusted using the Mean
Absolute Error (MAE) function. The Huber loss function is
shown below. {
1
2
(y − yˆ)2 |y − yˆ| ≤ δ,
δ|y − yˆ| − 1
2
δ2 otherwise
(6)
where y is the value of the original signal and yˆ is the value
of the perturbed signal. Equation 6 specifies the function used
to calculate the difference between two corresponding points
in the FFTs of the original signal and perturbation. These
differences are then summed and divided by the total number
of points to obtain an average, like what is done with MSE.
The value of δ used in this work is 1. Similar to MSE, Huber
loss is normalized such that the loss value is contained between
0 and 1.
C. Results
The primary qualitative metric used when examining the
success of the various spectral deception loss methods at
maintaining the spectral shape was visual inspection of the
PSD. Quantitative metrics used to validate the success of the
considered metrics include the BER of the intended com-
munications link and the achieved reduction in classification
accuracy of the eavesdropper. The results presented in this
section are predominantly examined with AMNs trained for
QPSK modulated signals. However, other modulation schemes
were also tested and exhibited the same characteristics. The
eavesdropper’s AMC used in this work was trained on BPSK,
QPSK, 8PSK, 16QAM, and 64QAM.
As mentioned previously, this FFT-based approach was
tested using both the MSE loss function and the Huber
loss function. Figure 5 shows the resulting PSDs of just the
perturbation for the MSE loss, Huber loss, and the original
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Fig. 6: The PSD for the adversarial signals created by the
MSE and Huber loss methods for the FFT-based approach on
QPSK signals.
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QPSK adversarial signals when with the deception loss that is
done on the FFT using both Huber and MSE loss. The signals
correspond to those shown in Figure 6.
power loss from the prior work. This figure illustrates that
there is slight improvement with the MSE method over the
power loss metric, but very minimal. However, the Huber loss
method exhibits much better behavior over the power loss
metric given that the shape of the perturbation is much more
in-band to the original signal. This difference is due to the
fact that the Huber loss is able to better handle situations of
extreme error, which can occur during the training process
especially at the start of training. Figure 6 shows the PSDs
of the resulting adversarial signals. As can be seen from this
figure, there is a trade off between the MSE method and the
Huber method with respect to side lobe growth vs. main lobe
corruption.
As expected, this trade-off in spectral shape performance
comes at the detriment of intended communication perfor-
mance. Figure 7 shows the BER and eavesdropper classifi-
cation accuracy over the SNR range of 0-20 dB of the two
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methods, along with the theoretical QPSK bit error rate with
no perturbation added. When using loss constants of α = 0.5,
β = 0.2, and γ = 0.3, the BER rate for the Huber method is
much worse than that of the MSE method. Additionally, when
the MSE deception loss is the only loss considered during
training (i.e. α and β are set to 0), the BER converges to the
theoretical curve, which does not occur for the Huber loss.
However, by adjusting the loss constants, the communication
performance can be made better as is shown by the Huber
result with α = 0.1, β = 0.8, and γ = 0.1. Naturally,
this does lead to worse evasion performance. Interestingly, in
Figure 6 it can be observed that the resulting spectral shape of
the adversarial signal does not seem to drastically change for
this second Huber trial even though the deception loss is less
prioritized. This shows that the constants can be adjusted to
meet the needs of the attack and that when using Huber loss
in the deception loss, the spectral shape can be maintained
even when less prioritized (so more priority can be spent on
evasion or communication improvement).
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The results of this work show the benefit of utilizing a
spectral deception loss metric within the considered machine
learning based adversarial evasion attack. The considered
FFT-based methods of developing this metric provided solid
improvements over the prior work and can be used as the
foundation for future work. Utilizing the FFT, two loss metrics
were considered, namely MSE and Huber losses. Performance
analysis demonstrated that the Huber loss was more successful
at maintaining the spectral shape of the original signal over the
MSE loss, at the cost of decreased intended communication
performance.
While these results show promise, there is still much future
work to develop the concept further. The various decep-
tion loss methods presented in this work are intended as
starting points and improving upon these may offer greater
success. For example, one simple adaptation could come in
the form of completing a more exhaustive parameter search
over the configurations for the deception loss. Additionally,
other functions than the FFT investigated here could be used
to determine and quantify the difference between the original
signal and the adversarial signal. For example, minimizing the
difference between the resulting PSDs and associated phases
could be examined. Finally, while mean squared error (MSE)
and Huber are good for determining the difference between
corresponding elements in an array of data, such as with time
domain samples, they may not be the most appropriate for the
frequency domain. Other functions, such as Fre´chet distance,
may provide better comparisons of similarity and should be
further studied.
The predominant method used in this work to determine
success of the loss was to qualitatively observe if the per-
turbation was concentrated in the main lobe of the signal.
While this may be sufficient in determining whether a human
operator can detect the adversarial signal, future work should
examine whether this adapted attack framework would be
effective in evading detection by a machine learning algorithm
aimed at detecting these attacks. Additionally, previous work
has assumed oversampling of the signal by the eavesdropper
which provides a larger attack vector for the evasion attack
in terms of available bandwidth outside of the signal’s main
lobe. Future work should loosen this assumption in order to
better test the success of the deception loss. Recent work has
focused on strategies that make the classifier networks more
robust against attacks such as utilizing curriculum training
[22]. Future work should examine the success of evasion
attacks against such defensive techniques when employing the
deception loss.
While the concept of a spectral deception loss is an ex-
tremely new area of focus, this work has shown that it is one
that offers great potential in the effort to mask the limitations
and distinguishing characteristics of existing evasion attacks.
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